The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process by Ross, William G.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 3
The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in
the Supreme Court Appointment Process
William G. Ross
Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment
Process, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 633 (1987), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/3
THE FUNCTIONS, ROLES, AND DUTIES OF THE SENATE
IN THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS
WILLIAM G. Ross*
I. INTRODUCTION
The turbulent Senate hearings and debates on the nomination of
William Rehnquist to serve as Chief Justice of the United States
revived a perennial controversy concerning the proper scope of the
Senate's role in considering Supreme Court appointments. In con-
trast to its customary practice of confirming the president's nomi-
nee by an overwhelming vote, the Senate approved Rehnquist by
the comparatively narrow vote of sixty-five to thirty-three, the
thinnest margin any successful nominee has received since 1912.1
The Senate's careful and prolonged consideration of the Rehnquist
nomination is a reminder that the Senate is not merely a rubber
stamp for the president's nomination, even though the president's
choice rarely encounters serious opposition. Although no one seri-
ously argues that the Senate's review of Supreme Court nomina-
tions should be purely perfunctory, the highly political tone of
much of the opposition to Rehnquist and the Senate's exacting in-
quiry into Rehnquist's judicial and political philosophies raised
* Member of the New York Bar; Associate at Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, New
York; A.B. 1976, Stanford University; J.D. 1979, Harvard Law School. The author also
teaches a course on the history of the United States Supreme Court and the Constitution at
the New School for Social Research.
1. The Senate confirmed Mahlon Pitney on March 13, 1912, by a margin of 50 to 26. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 14, 1912, at 8, col. 6. Of the 39 successful Supreme Court nominees between the
confirmations of Pitney and those of Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia in
1986, only eight received more than 10 negative votes: Charles Evans Hughes in 1930 (52-
26); William Rehnquist in 1971 (68-26); Louis D. Brandeis in 1916 (47-22); Potter Stewart in
1959 (70-17); Sherman Minton in 1949 (48-16); Hugo Black in 1937 (63-16); Thurgood Mar-
shall in 1967 (69-11); and John Marshall Harlan II in 1955 (71-11). Of the 55 nominations
since 1900, the Senate has rejected only three (John J. Parker in 1930, Clement F. Hayn-
sworth, Jr., in 1969, and G. Harrold Carswell in 1970), and only two others (Abe Fortas and
Homer Thornberry in 1968) have been withdrawn. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 199, 13, 180, 269, 47, 290, 260
(2d ed. 1985).
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questions about the factors that the Senate properly may consider
in evaluating Supreme Court nominations.' Not since critics ac-
cused the Senate of playing politics in rejecting the nomination of
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., in 1969 and G. Harrold Carswell in
19708 has the Senate's role in the appointment process come under
such widespread scrutiny.
Despite the recurring questions about the scope of the Senate's
role in the confirmation process, most scholars agree that the Sen-
ate must examine the nominee's professional competence and ethi-
cal integrity and that the Senate may, and indeed, should, inquire
into a nominee's judicial and political philosophy.4 At the same
time, however, commentators generally agree that the Senate
would abuse its constitutional prerogative if it rejected a nominee
on grounds that were arbitrary, capricious, or blatantly political.
But this consenses leaves much room for questions about the exact
scope of the Senate's inquiry and the extent to which the Senate
ought to defer to the president's choice.
In assessing the Senate's role in the confirmation process, the
custom is to examine the factors that the Senate may consider in
evaluating a nominee. A discussion of such factors would be more
meaningful, however, if placed in the context of a consideration of
the functions, roles, and duties of the Senate in the confirmation
process. This Article analyzes the proper scope of the Senate's role
to advise and consent in Supreme Court appointments by examin-
ing these functions. The Senate currently has five functions in the
confirmation process: 1) to review and investigate the nominee's
intellectual, professional, physical, psychological, moral, and ethi-
cal qualifications; 2) to act as a check on presidential favoritism; 3)
to evaluate the political and judicial philosophies of the nominee;
4) to interview the nominee; and 5) to serve as a forum for the
2. E.g., 132 CONG. REC. S 12,818 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statements of Senators DeCon-
cini and Hatch).
3. E.g., McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59
Ky. L.J. 7, 14-24 (1970).
4. E.g., Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE
L.J. 657 (1970); Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, HARV. L. REc., Oct. 8,
1959, at 7; Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional
Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 554 (1986); see also L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE
THis HONORABLE COURT (1985). But cf. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confir-
mation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986).
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expression of views on the nomination by members of the bar, spe-
cial interest groups, and private citizens. In order to understand
these functions and duties, one must first examine the language of
the Constitution and the intentions of the Framers.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION AND EARLY HISTORY
With that combination of brevity and ambiguity that is so char-
acteristic of the Constitution, article II, section 2 provides simply
that the president shall nominate, and "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .Judges of the Su-
preme Court."5 The text of the Constitution clearly provides that
although the power to present a candidate for the Court is vested
solely in the president, the power of appointment is exercised con-
currently with the Senate, which must review the nomination and
may reject the president's choice. The Constitution says nothing
about the criteria upon which the Senate may base its decision.
Technically, therefore, the Senate may reject a nominee for any
reason.
Examining the intent of the Framerg is the first step in divining
the meaning of the delphic phrase "Advice and Consent." As with
so many other phrases of the Constitution, however, determining
the Framers' intent proves impossible because different Framers
undoubtedly harbored different intentions. The procedure for ap-
pointment of Supreme Court justices in fact represented a compro-
mise between delegates who wanted the power of appointment to
reside in the president and those who wanted to vest the power
solely in the Senate. This compromise was part of a larger process
whereby the Convention, fearful of creating a senatorial oligarchy,
restricted the Senate's powers and concomitantly increased the
powers of the president.6 Indeed, the Constitutional Convention
came very close to granting the Senate sole power of appointment.
Early in its proceedings, on June 5, 1787, the delegates debated a
proposal to vest the appointment power in both houses of Con-
gress; the delegates, however, were unable to agree upon any
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6. 1 G. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 464-65 (1897 and photo.
reprint 1974).
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method of selection.7 James Wilson opposed the proposal, arguing
that experience showed "the impropriety of such appoin[tments]
by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality and concealment were the
necessary consequences." 8 Wilson contended that a "principal rea-
son for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed
by a single, responsible person."9 John Rutledge of South Carolina,
however, was "by no means disposed to grant so great a power to
any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much
towards Monarchy."' 10 James Madison disliked permitting the Con-
gress or any numerous body to elect judges, but likewise registered
dissatisfaction with referring the appointment to the Executive."
Accordingly, "[hie rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial
branch, as numerous eno' to be confided in-as not so numerous as
to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as being
sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judg-
ments."' 2 Benjamin Franklin said that he wished still "other
modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it being
a point of great moment."' 3 Because opinion on this question of
"great moment" was so disparate, the Convention voted nine to
two to defer consideration until a time of "maturer reflection."' 4
The Convention next considered the issue on June 13, when it
adopted a motion offered by James Madison providing for senato-
rial appointment of judges.' 5 Madison offered the motion in re-
sponse to a proposal by Charles Pinckney and Roger Sherman that
both houses of Congress appoint judges.'" Reiterating his earlier
7. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 67-69 (1976).
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 68. Like Wilson, Madison warned of "the danger of intrigue and partiality" and
questioned the ability of legislators to evaluate the requisite qualifications of judges.
Madison also stated that "[i]t was known too that the accidental circumstances of presence
and absence, of being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the ap-
pointment." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 67-68. Franklin, in an "entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which
the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profes-
sion in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves." Id. at 68.
14. Id. at 68.
15. Id. at 113, 116.
16. Id. at 112-13.
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arguments, Madison objected to this proposal on the ground that
many congressmen would be "incompetent Judges of the requisite
qualifications" of judges and that they might be partial toward
persons "who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative
field, who perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their
own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means. ' '17
Madison proposed that the Senate, as a more select and less nu-
merous body, could evaluate judicial candidates more competently
than could the House."8
The Convention did not debate the issue again for another
month. In the meantime, two delegates proposed appointment by
the executive. On June 15, William Paterson advocated that the
executive appoint all federal judges. 9 On June 18, Alexander Ham-
ilton proposed that the executive nominate various officers, includ-
ing judges, "subject to the approbation or rejection of the
Senate."2
The delegates debated the question again on July 18, when the
Convention reconsidered the resolution to provide for appointment
by the Senate.2' As in the original debate, the Convention was di-
vided and failed to agree upon any new proposal. Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts argued that the Senate was "too numer-
ous, and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good
choice. ' 22 Gorham contended that the executive "would certainly
be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of
a bad one would fall on him alone"2 3 and that "[p]ublic bodies feel
no personal responsibility, and give full play to intrigue [and] ca-
bal." 2 4 He suggested that the judges be appointed by the executive,
17. Id.
18. Id. at 113. Given Madison's preference for a strong executive and his later sponsor-
ship of a motion to vest the appointment power in the president subject to approval by two-
thirds of the Senate, he may have contrived his motion on June 13 as a means of moving the
Convention toward presidential participation in the appointment process. In any event, the
motion eliminated the House of Representatives from the appointment process and paved
the way for nomination of justices by the executive.
19. Id. at 120.
20. Id. at 138.
21. Id. at 314.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 316.
24. Id. at 315.
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with the advice and consent of the Senate, as was prescribed by
the Constitution of Massachusetts.25 Roger Sherman, however,
contended that the executive would be vulnerable to intrigue. 6
Likewise, Bedford insisted that the "responsibility of the Execu-
tive so much talked of was chimerical. He could not be punished
for mistakes."2 A motion for appointment by the executive failed
by a vote of six to two, and a motion by Gorham for appointment
by the executive by and with the advice of the Senate was defeated
in a tie vote." The Senate adjourned without deciding upon a pro-
posal by Madison for appointment by the president, subject to a
two-thirds vote by the Senate.29
The Convention did not reconsider Madison's proposal until
July 21. Once again, the debate reflected a wide disparity of opin-
ion.3 0 In explaining his motion, Madison stated that the president
"would in general be more capable [and] likely to select fit charac-
ters than the Legislature."'3 Madison also argued that the presi-
dent, unlike the Senate, would be "acting for and equally
sympathising with every part" of the nation and that senatorial
appointment would "throw the appointments entirely into the
hands" of the more numerous Northern states3 -a fearsome pros-
pect for a Virginian! Charles Pinckney maintained, however, that
the "Executive will possess neither the requisite knowledge of
characters, nor confidence of the people for so high a trust. '33
Likewise, Oliver Ellsworth argued that the executive "will be more
open to caresses [and] intrigues than the Senate. '34 Randolph ar-
gued, however, that intrigues were more likely to occur in the Sen-
25. Id. at 314.
26. Id. at 316.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 343-46.
30. Id. Similarly, Governeur Morris argued in support of Madison's motion that the "Ex-
ecutive in the necessary intercourse with every part of the U.S. required by the nature of his
administration, will or may have the best possible information," while the Senate "must
take the character of candidates from the flattering pictures drawn by their friends." Id. at
345.
31. Id. at 344.
32. Id.
33. Id. Elbridge Gerry likewise contended that he "could not conceive that the Executive
could be as well informed of characters throughout the Union, as the Senate." Id. at 345.
34. Id.
[Vol. 28:633638
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ate.3 5 Madison's motion, modified to require only majority ap-
proval by the Senate, was defeated in a three to six vote.36
Accordingly, the June 13 resolution for appointment by the Senate
was retained.
Except for a brief and inconclusive debate on August 23," the
issue lay dormant until September 4, when the Special Committee
on Postponed Matters made a report providing for executive nomi-
nation of Supreme Court justices with the advice and consent of
the Senate.3 8 The proposal generated relatively little debate when
considered on September 6 and 7. Morris, who had previously fa-
vored appointment by the executive, supported the plan, explain-
ing that as "the President was to nominate, there would be respon-
sibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security." 9 Although Pinckney and Wilson spoke against giving
the Senate any say in judicial appointments, the Convention
adopted the committee's measure almost without dissent.40
Despite the divergent opinions of the Framers respecting the
Senate's role in the judicial appointment process, two conclusions
emerge from the debates. First, most of the delegates envisioned
an active role for the Senate because so many of the delegates who
had favored appointment by the Senate alone were willing to as-
sent to the eleventh-hour compromise. As Professor Charles Black
has observed, those delegates could not have thought that the leg-
islative part in the process had been reduced to a minimum.41 Sec-
ond, the delegates desired that the president and the Senate evalu-
ate candidates with great care, appoint only highly qualified
judges, and eschew personal prejudice. This is hardly surprising.
The debates do not reveal, however, whether the Senate may prop-
erly base its decision upon the political philosophy of a nominee.
35. Id. at 344. According to Randolph, "[a]ppointments by the Legislatures have gener-
ally resulted from cabal, from personal regard, or some other consideration than a title de-
rived from the proper qualifications." Id.
36. Id. at 346.
37. Id. at 517.
38. Id. at 575.
39. Id. at 598.
40. Id. at 599.
41. Black, supra note 4, at 661. Black concluded that "[t]he. . .process, to me, suggests
the very reverse of the idea that the Senate is to have a confined role." Id.
1987]
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Similarly, the debates on the Constitution in the state conven-
tions do not illuminate the intentions of either the Framers or
those who voted on ratification.2 Even the few recorded comments
on the appointment power offer little information; some persons
expressed fear that the appointment power would give the presi-
dent an undue power over the Senate while others argued that it
would have the opposite tendency.43 To Hamilton, this division of
opinion was "a strong proof that neither suggestion is true."44
Hamilton's discussion of the appointment power in numbers
sixty-six, seventy-six, and seventy-seven of The Federalist offers
the most thorough contemporary interpretation of the advice and
consent clause. Hamilton's discourse ultimately adds little to what
the debates themselves reveal about the Framers' intentions, how-
ever. Like the debates, Hamilton's essays express a concern that
the Senate should help ensure that the president select meritorious
justices rather than personal favorites. According to Hamilton, re-
quiring the Senate's concurrence "would be an excellent check
upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly
to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or
from a view to popularity."45
Hamilton suggested, however, that the Senate's function would
be limited to checking cronyism.4 6 Indeed, Hamilton argued that
the real power of appointment would reside in the president. He
stated that "one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and
estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a
body of men of equal, or perhaps even of superior discernment. 47
42. J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 25 (1953). See generally, S. BOYD,
THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION, ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1979).
43. J. HARRIS, supra note 42, at 25; THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 497 (A. Hamilton) (Mod-
ern Library ed. 1937).
44. Id.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 494 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1937). Hamilton
contended that the president "would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward ...
candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he
particularly belonged, or of being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of pos-
sessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments
of his pleasure." Id. at 495.
46. Id. at 494.
47. Id. at 492.
[Vol. 28:633
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS
He contended that a "single well directed man ... cannot be dis-
tracted and warped by that diversity of views, feelings and inter-
ests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collec-
tive body. '48 Moreover, each of Hamilton's three relevant essays
emphasizes that the Senate would exercise a high level of defer-
ence toward the president's appointment. In number sixty-six, for
example, Hamilton explained that the Senate would not reject the
president's candidate merely because senators preferred someone
else because they could not be certain "that the subsequent nomi-
nation would fall upon their own favorite, or upon any person in
their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected."49 Hamil-
ton therefore contended that the Senate's "sanction would [not]
often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons
for the refusal. '50
Hamilton's essays are illuminating, but they do not necessarily
represent the mainstream of thought at either the Constitutional
Convention or the ratification conventions, in as much as Hamilton
was a particularly ardent advocate of a potent executive. Moreover,
none of his essays were concerned exclusively with the appoint-
ment of Supreme Court justices; they also dealt with presidential
appointments of diplomats. Certainly, the appointment of a justice
warrants much more intensive senatorial scrutiny than does the
appointment of "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls. '51 On the other hand, the fact that Hamilton was bold enough
to emphasize the power of the executive in essays written to help
with the adoption of the Constitution in New York, an anti-federal
48. Id.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 433 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1937). Similarly,
Hamilton wrote in No. 76 that "[t]he Senate could not be tempted by the preference they
might feel to another to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves
that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subse-
quent nomination." THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 45, at 494. Hamilton emphasized
that the rejection of one presidential choice would only make room for another presidential
choice and that "[tihe person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference,
though pehaps not in the first degree." Id.
50. Id. With perhaps less prescience, John Adams predicted in 1787 that "[flaction and
distraction are the sure and certain consequences of giving to a senate a vote on the distri-
bution of offices." J. HARRIS, supra note 42, at 29.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
1987]
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state, suggests Antifederalists were not strongly opposed to giving
broad deference to the president's choice.
2
An examination of the role of the Senate during the first years
following the Constitution's ratification reveals the distance be-
tween Hamilton's theory and the intentions of other Framers. The
early Senate was anything but the restrained and deferential body
that Hamilton had envisioned. From the start, it exercised a high
degree of independence and influence in the appointment process.
Only three months into its first term, the Senate established the
precedent of "senatorial courtesy" by rejecting a highly qualified
nominee for a naval position in Savannah because the two senators
from Georgia preferred a different candidate.5 Fully acquiescent
to the new protocol, President Washington sent a message to the
Senate stating that he was sure that the Senate had sufficient rea-
sons for the rejection; he added drily, however, that he could not
discern those reasons. He asked only that the Senate spare him
further embarrassment by making its preference known in advance
of future appointments. 4 At about this same time Washington
wrote, "[A]s the President has a right to nominate without as-
signing his reasons, so has the Senate a right to dissent without
giving theirs. '55
Six years later, the Senate asserted itself dramatically when it
rejected Washington's nomination of John Rutledge by a vote of
fourteen to ten. Although Rutledge's foes spread the rumor that
Rutledge was insane, opposition focused on Rutledge's vehement
rejection of the Jay Treaty. 6 The Senate's rejection of Rutledge
52. This argument is particularly convincing if one agrees with Professor Crosskey's the-
ory that the Federalist Papers minimized federal power because the essays were addressed
to an Antifederalist audience in New York. 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
8-11 (1953). Some validity may be recognized in Professor Crosskey's theory even if one
does not accept Crosskey's general derogation of the Federalist Papers as a means of consti-
tutional interpretation. Crosskey's theory may be overstated, however, since it appears that
the Federalist Papers "enjoyed at least some circulation and esteem outside New York dur-
ing the course of their serial publication." Brown, Book Review, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1439, 1445
(1954).
53. J. HARRIS, supra note 42, at 40.
54. Id. at 41.
55. Id. at 39.
56. See, e.g., J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECED-
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 748 (1971) (Volume I of the Oliver Wendell Holmes De-
vise); H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 33; 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
[Vol. 28:633
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for partisan reasons, unrelated to his fitness to serve on the Court,
is revealing of the Framers' intentions because several of the sena-
tors who voted against Rutledge had been delegates to the Phila-
delphia Convention. Washington, who had presided over the Con-
vention, does not appear to have regarded the Senate's action as
unconstitutional; and, significantly, the principal opposition to
Rutledge came from Federalists,57  who favored a strong
presidency.
On several other occasions during the nineteenth century, the
Senate reviewed appointments to the Court with a free-wheeling
partisanship that probably would evoke strong criticism today. In
1811, for example, the Senate rejected Alexander Wolcott by a vote
of nine to twenty-four, partly because of doubts about his profes-
sional qualifications but principally because he had vigorously op-
posed enforcement of the Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts when
he was a customs official.58 In 1870, the Senate refused to confirm
Ebenezer Hoar because of his refusal to support partisan judicial
appointments, his advocacy of civil service reform, and his opposi-
tion to Andrew Johnson's impeachment.59 Similarly, in 1894, the
Senate rejected two of President Cleveland's nominees, William B.
Hornblower and Wheeler H. Peckham, because Cleveland had re-
fused to nominate persons suggested by New York's powerful Sen-
ator David B. Hill.6 0 Although the Senate rejected or failed to con-
firm several other nominees for political reasons, most of those
nominees had been proposed by lame duck or unelected presi-
dents.6 ' The actual extent of the Senate's rejection of nominees
HISTORY 134-35 (rev. ed. 1935). The effect of the rumors concerning Rutledge's mental sta-
bility should not be completely discounted, however, because Rutledge had already dis-
played bizarre behavior in his highly intemperate attacks on the Jay Treaty; later he be-
came demonstrably insane. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE CouRT 56-58 (1965).
57. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 33; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 56, at 135-36.
58. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 33; 1 C. WARREN, supra note 56, at 410-13.
59. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 34.
60. Id. at 18; Pierce, A Vacancy on the Supreme Court: The Politics of Judicial Appoint-
ment 1893-94, 39 TENN. L. REV. 555, 565-612 (1972).
61. For example, in February 1829 the Senate indefinitely postponed action on John Crit-
tenden, who was nominated by John Quincy Adams after his defeat for reelection. During
the final year of the tenure of John Tyler, the first unelected president, the Senate rejected
one nominee, John C. Spencer, forced the withdrawal of the nominations of two more, Reu-
ben H. Walworth and Edward King, and took no action on a fourth, John M. Read. In 1853,
the Senate formally voted to postpone consideration of George E. Badger, and informally
1987]
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during the nineteenth century, therefore, is not so great as the
numbers suggest. Nevertheless, politics clearly played a part in the
confirmation process. In addition, many of the nominees actually
confirmed did encounter politically-inspired opposition.6 2 An ex-
amination of the text of the Constitution, the intentions of the
Framers, and the early history of the confirmation process there-
fore provide support for vesting a high level of discretion in the
Senate.
III. REVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS
Throughout its history, the Senate has remained true to the in-
tention of the Framers that the Senate's principal roles would be
to ensure the appointment of competent persons and to check any
presidential favoritism. Because service as a justice requires a high
level of intellect, the Senate first considers a nominee's profes-
sional qualifications.6 Presidents rarely have nominated persons
postponed indefinitely its consideration of William C. Micou, nominees of the unelected
Fillmore, less than one month before Fillmore's term expired. During the previous year, the
Senate had failed to take any action on Fillmore's nomination of Edward A. Bradford
shortly before a presidential election in which Fillmore was not a candidate. In 1860, it
rejected Jeremiah S. Black, whom the lame duck Buchanan had appointed. In 1866, the
Senate failed to take any action on Andrew Johnson's nomination of Henry Stanbery. From
the Senate's rejection of Rutledge in 1795 to its rejection of Parker in 1930, there were 94
nominations, but only 73 were made by presidents who were neither lame ducks nor were
serving out the terms of the predecessors. Of these 73 nominations, the Senate rejected or
forced the withdrawal of only 8. In addition to Wolcott, Hoar, Hornblower, and Peckham,
those nominees were: Roger B. Taney (action postponed on first nomination in 1835);
George Woodward (rejected in 1846); and George H. Williams and Caleb Cushing (nomina-
tions withdrawn in 1874). See A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUS-
TIcEs 122-23 (1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 142-48.
62. See generally H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 64-144.
63. As Professors Kurland and Tribe have observed:
[t]he men and women of the federal bench must possess open minds that are
capable of grasping sophisticated legal analysis, and that can grapple intelli-
gently with fundamental constitutional issues. To federal judges is given the
task of policing the boundaries between state and federal government, of giving
principled articulation to the content of basic human rights protected by the
Constitution, of enforcing the myriad and complex federal statutes and regula-
tions, and of overseeing complicated commercial and criminal litigation. Sena-
tors therefore have a duty, both to the Constitution and to the nation's citi-
zens, businesses and public and private institutions, to ensure that the
President's nominees have the experience, the talent, the intellectual acumen,
and the fairness of mind to perform their functions and, particularly in the
case of appellate judges, to contribute lucidly to a body of legal precedents that
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whose intellectual or judicial reputations made them obvious
choices for a seat on the Supreme Court. Holmes, Taft, Cardozo,
and Frankfurter are among the few exceptions. Likewise, presi-
dents often have passed over brilliant candidates such as Learned
Hand 4 or Paul Freund. 5 Nevertheless, the nominees during this
century almost always have had outstanding legal qualifications.6
Consequently, the Senate's review of professional qualifications
usually has been perfunctory. Although senators occasionally have
expressed concern about a candidate's lack of prior judicial experi-
ence,6 7 the Senate is tolerant of that deficiency because so many
distinguished justices had no previous judicial experience.6 8
Although the public and the legal profession have grumbled
about the lack of distinction of such nominees as Hugo Black and
Tom Clark, the only recent nominee to encounter serious objec-
enlighten and guide trial courts, litigants, and those who must try to anticipate
what courts will do.
Letter from Philip Kurland and Laurence Tribe to Senate Judiciary Committee (June 1,
1986).
64. See, e.g., G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERI-
CAN JUDGES 262-63 (1976).
65. This may be partly attributable to the rarity of unanimity about who really is an
"obvious" choice for a seat on the Court.
66. A substantial share of justices have started their careers with elite education. For
example, five of the present nine justices, Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Scalia, have degrees from Harvard; two, Rehnquist and O'Connor, have two degrees from
Stanford; one, White, is a Yale Law School graduate; and Stevens has degrees from Chicago
and Northwestern. After the completion of their schooling, most justices have gone on to
occupy particularly notable positions in the legal community. For example, Brennan was a
New Jersey Supreme Court justice; Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia were judges of
the United States Court of Appeals; Scalia also taught at several prestigious law schools;
Rehnquist served as a deputy United States Attorney General; and Powell had been presi-
dent of the American Bar Association.
67. E.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Arthur
J. Goldberg, of Illinois, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1962) [hereinafter Hearings on Goldberg]. In reply to Senator
Hruska's question about his lack of judicial experience, Goldberg stated that he had a "well-
rounded legal experience" and that such luminaries of the Court as John Marshall, Felix
Frankfurter, and Charles Evans Hughes had no prior judicial experience. Id. During the
hearings on John Marshall Harlan, Senator Richard Russell said that while he was "very
loath to oppose any nominations submitted to this body by the Chief Executive," he would
oppose the nomination of John Marshall Harlan, who had served as a judge for only a few
months, because there were so many able sitting judges. 101 CONG. REC. 3035 (1955).
68. For example, Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, and Chief Justice Warren had no
prior experience. A. BLAUSTEIN & R. MERSKY, supra note 61, at 37, 69; see also McKay,
Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 KAN. L. REV. 109, 124-25 (1960).
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tions to his professional fitness was G. Harrold Carswell in 1970.9
Although Carswell had served for a dozen years as a federal dis-
trict judge and had been elevated to the court of appeals the year
before his nomination to the Supreme Court, his qualifications to
serve on the nation's highest bench were widely disputed. One
prominent witness at the Senate hearings derided Carswell as a
"dull graduate of the third best law school in the State of Geor-
gia."'70 Others questioned his intellectual ability because he had
written no scholarly articles, his district court opinions were poorly
written and rarely cited by other judges, and he lacked special ex-
pertise in any area of the law.7' Studies revealing that his district
court decisions had been reversed more than twice as often as
those of the average federal district judge raised more telling and
perhaps fairer doubts concerning Judge Carswell's competence.72
Judge Carswell's detractors were neither placated nor amused by
Senator Hruska's celebrated suggestion that mediocre people, too,
deserve representation on the Court.7
Despite the many questions about Judge Carswell's abilities, his
lack of intellectual distinction probably would not have been fatal
if serious doubt had not also been raised about his commitment to
racial justice. Although many persons forgave him when he apolo-
69. Prior to Carswell, the last nominee whose appointment appears to have been thwarted
by concerns over his professional abilities was George H. Williams in 1874. H. ABRAHAM,
supra note 1, at 38, 121 (1974 ed.).
70. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of George Har-
rold Carswell, of Florida, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings on Carswell] (testimony of Stephen I.
Schlossberg, Gen. Counsel, Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers).
71. See, e.g., id. at 134-36 (testimony of Prof. William Van Alstyne); see also McConnell,
supra note 3, at 23.
72. McConnell, supra note 3, at 23. As McConnell points out, Judge Carswell's record of
reversal revealed a chronic inability to follow the law as articulated by higher authority.
That Carswell's judicial record was used against him is ironic because lengthy judicial expe-
rience ought to have been an asset. Professors Grossman and Wasby observe that "all three
nominees rejected in this century were lower court judges, a factor tending to indicate the
vulnerability which such service may bring and which could perhaps inhibit the President's
selection of one whose judicial record is at least partly known." Grossman & Wasby, The
Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557, 568.
73. Senator Hruska told a radio interviewer that "[e]ven if he were mediocre, there are a
lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation,
aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozos and stuff like
that there." R. HARRIS, DECISION 110 (1971).
[Vol. 28:633
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS
gized for a speech in which he had advocated white supremacy
twenty years earlier, his subsequent record suggests that time did
not significantly temper his views on race. His allegedly tepid deci-
sions on desegregation and his involvement in the transfer of a golf
course to private ownership in order to avoid racial integration
provoked stern rebukes from many senators and Judiciary Com-
mittee witnesses. 7 4 Judge Carswell's generally conservative politics
cost him support,75 as did resentment over President Nixon's
heavy-handed criticism of the confirmation proceedings. 6 In short,
Judge Carswell's deficiencies as a lawyer and a judge caused only
part of the Senate's misgivings; the effect of those deficiencies
upon his ultimate defeat by a forty-five to fifty-one vote is impossi-
ble to isolate.7 7 The narrow margin of defeat makes such a calcula-
tion especially difficult.
The Senate's deliberations on Carswell demonstrate that the
Senate will accord a high level of deference to the president's
choice, even when the nominee possesses mediocre professional
qualifications.78 Deference to the president's choice inheres in the
74. Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, at 11-13, 35-37, 49.
75. See, e.g., id. at 85-101 (testimony of Betty Friedan, President of the National Organi-
zation for Women), 267-78 (testimony of Clarence Mitchell, Legislative Chairman, Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights).
76. Grossman & Washy, supra note 72, at 558 n.4.
77. The widespread hostility generated by the Carswell appointment probably caused the
Senate to be more exacting. For example, the committee cited Carswell's failure to publish
any legal articles as a deficiency; yet relatively few Supreme Court nominees have been dis-
tinguished authors. Harry Blackmun published only three articles over the course of twenty
years, and none of those articles appears to have been particularly notable. Similarly, John
Paul Stevens published only a few articles, and Sandra Day O'Connor authored only one law
review article. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of
Harry Blackmun, of Minnesota, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings on Blackmun]; Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of John Paul Stevens, of Illinois, to be
an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1975) [hereinafter Hearings on Stevens]; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary on Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, of Arizona, to be an Assoc. Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 172 (1981) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on O'Connor].
78. The Senate's tolerance for undistinguished nominees may be attributed in part to the
difficulty of predicting performance on the bench. Little in the background of Hugo Black,
for example, suggested that he would grow to become one of the Court's most brilliant ju-
rists. Likewise, Tom Clark's record on the bench turned out to be better than his detractors
had predicted. Conversely, Charles Evans Whittaker found that the Court's work taxed him
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
president's power to nominate. As Hamilton observed in The Fed-
eralist, the Senate "may defeat one choice of the Executive, and
oblige him to make another, but they cannot themselves
choose-they can only ratify or reject the choice, of the Presi-
dent.17 9 Still, as the rejection of Carswell suggests, a president
must be wary of nominating someone whose professional creden-
tials are slender. Indeed, on at least a few occasions, adverse reac-
tion to the qualifications of potential nominees may have pre-
vented their nomination. 0
In addition to reviewing the professional fitness of nominees, the
Senate occasionally has reviewed a nominee's physical fitness.
Presidents generally nominate persons whose health is robust be-
cause they hope that their nominees will have long tenures. Health
therefore is not usually an issue and has never been a serious issue.
On at least three occasions since World War II, however, it has
figured briefly in confirmation hearings. In 1949, members of the
Judiciary Committee discussed the health of Sherman Minton,
who had suffered a serious illness several years earlier. The sena-
tors satisfied themselves that he had recovered sufficiently and
that his general health was sound."s The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee questioned John Paul Stevens about his health at his confirma-
tion hearings in 1975 because he had undergone a cardiac opera-
tion one year earlier. Stevens discussed his operation in detail and
presented letters from four physicians who attested to his good
health. 2 William Rehnquist's hospitalization for problems related
to a back condition were a minor issue at his confirmation hearings
in 1986.83
almost beyond endurance, although no one questioned his professional qualifications when
he was nominated.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 49, at 433.
80. In 1971, for example, the American Bar Association's lack of enthusiasm for Califor-
nia State Court of Appeals Judge Mildred Lillie and Arkansas municipal bond attorney
Herschel Friday may have prevented Nixon from nominating either of those persons to the
Court. E.g., H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 29.
81. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Sherman
Minton, of Indiana, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949) [hereinafter Hearings on Minton].
82. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 8-12.
83. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of William
Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 299, 366-67 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearings on Rehnquist].
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Like physical fitness, psychological fitness as such has never
been a major issue in confirmation proceedings. Occasionally, how-
ever, the Senate has considered the psychological health of a nomi-
nee under the rubric of "judicial temperament." The question of
judicial temperament often has been a smoke screen for other ob-
jections to a nominee's candidacy. The hand-wringing in 1916 over
Louis Brandeis's alleged lack of judicial temperament, for example,
appears to have been a rationalization for opposition to his social
activism and ideology. 4 Similarly, discussion of G. Harrold Cars-
well's judicial temperament was part of larger misgivings regarding
his racial attitudes. Several former civil rights workers from the
North who had appeared before Judge Carswell during the sum-
mer of 1964 testified that he was belligerent toward them, that-he
connived with local officials to deprive them of their rights, and
that his rudeness toward blacks in his courtroom contrasted with
his courteous treatment of local whites.8 5 Judicial temperament
also arose briefly during the deliberations on Thurgood Marshall,
when Marshall's opponents suggested that Marshall willfully had
distorted the history of the fourteenth amendment in preparing
the plaintiff's case in Brown v. Board of Education.8 6 Marshall's
remarks were explained to the Judiciary Committee's satisfac-
tion."' Here again, concern over judicial temperament may have
84. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Louis D.
Brandeis to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1916); A. MASON, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN'S LIFE 465-510 (1940). The attacks on Bran-
deis also contained "a leavening of anti-Semitism." A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-1921, at 367 (Volume
IX of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise).
85. Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, at 149-95. The specific testimony of these wit-
nesses was not rebutted, although a district court clerk defended Carswell's demeanor to-
ward civil rights workers. Id. at 197.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. In a paper presented to an historical association, history Professor Alfred H. Kelly of
Wayne State University stated that in preparing the argument in Brown, Marshall had been
"emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts." Kelly used this remark to con-
trast the subjective use of facts by lawyers with the objective use of facts by historians. In
his testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Kelly
stated that he did not intend to suggest that Marshall actually had distorted facts. Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, of
New York, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
181-82 (1962). This issue surfaced again when Marshall was nominated to the Supreme
Court. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Thurgood
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masked deeper problems, especially objections to Marshall's politi-
cal liberalism.
Senators have a duty to the nominee, the president, the Court,
and the public to be honest about their objections to a nominee;
senators should not use the issue of judicial temperament as a pre-
text for opposing a nominee on political grounds. This is not to
say, however, that senators should not evaluate a nominee's judi-
cial temperament. As Professor Tribe has observed, "[p]erhaps the
most important qualification for being a Supreme Court Justice is
the possession of an open mind.""8 No one could gainsay that a
sense of justice and fairness is an indispensable attribute for any
person who sits on the nation's highest judicial tribunal.
The Senate must also evaluate the moral and ethical fitness of
nominees to the Court. Beginning with the unsuccessful nomina-
tion of John J. Parker in 1930, the question of morality most often
has centered on the candidate's racial attitudes. In addition to its
role in the Parker nomination, 9 racial sensitivity was an issue in
the nominations of Carswell,90 Haynsworth, 9' and Powell"2 and on
both Rehnquist93 nominations. It was also a factor in the defeat of
Carswell.9 4 The issue of ethics sometimes has concerned personal
finances or conflicts of interest, as in the nominations of Hayn-
sworth, Fortas, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Harlan and Ste-
vens also were accused of improper conduct in connection with
public investigations.9 5
Marshall, of New York, to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 182-85 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on Marshall].
88. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 103.
89. Mendelsohn, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Appointments: The Nomina-
tion and Rejection of John J. Parker, 14 How. L.J. 105, 121-23 (1968).
90. Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, passim.
91. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Clement F.
Haynsworth, of South Carolina, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1969) [hereinafter Hearings on Haynsworthl.
92. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of William H.
Rehnquist, of Arizona, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to be Assoc. Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1971) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on Rehnquist and Powell].
93. Hearings on Rehnquist, supra note 83, passim; Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell;
supra note 92, passim.
94. Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, passim.
95. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of John Mar-
shall Harlan, of New York, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
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Because only men and women of the highest integrity should sit
on the Supreme Court, the Senate should probe deeply into any
charge that impugns the ethical or moral fitness of a nominee. Op-
position based upon a nominee's philosophy, however, often mas-
querades as concern about a nominee's ethics. Commentators have
suggested, for example, that Blackmun's decision to participate in
cases involving corporations in which he owned stock raised ethical
questions at least as serious as those raised concerning similar con-
duct by Haynsworth.9 6 The Senate confirmed Blackmun by a vote
of eighty-eight to zero, and rejected Haynsworth ostensibly be-
cause of his ethical insensitivity. The real reasons for Haynsworth's
defeat, however, may be traced to senatorial hostility toward
Nixon and concerns over Haynsworth's judicial conservatism."'
Similarly, opposition to Rehnquist in 1971 and 1986 may have
been inspired more by his conservatism than by charges that he
intimidated black voters or engaged in other unscrupulous
conduct.9 8
A corollary of the Senate's duty to review the professional fitness
of nominees is its duty to investigate charges that cast doubt on
such fitness. Since the earliest days of the Republic, Congress has
asserted a power to investigate matters of public concern.9 The
Senate therefore may employ its investigatory power when it pro-
vides advice and consent on Supreme Court nominations. Although
the administration customarily investigates a nominee in order to
avoid embarrassment, the administration's own investigations
sometimes have proved deficient. 100 This may be attributable in
part to the administration's reluctance to dig too deeply into the
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-41 (1955); Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 60-62. In both
cases, the accusations were based solely on the testimony of a single individual, and the
committee quickly concluded that the nominees had committed no impropriety.
96. McConnell, supra note 3, at 26.
97. Grossman & Wasby, supra note 72, at 570-71; Lively, supra note 4, at 575 n.143.
98. As Senator DeConcini stated during the debates on Rehnquist in 1986, "Let us not
kid ourselves. This is not an issue about a restriction in a deed or about supposedly chal-
lenging voters. This is an issue of whether or not a very conservative sitting Justice should
be moved to the position of Chief Justice." 132 CONG. REc. S 12,818 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1986).
99. B. SCHWARTZ, FROM CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835-
1877, at 69-71 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Grossman & Wasby, supra note 72, at 579, 587; Lively, supra note 4, at
577.
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past of a candidate that it finds attractive, but another reason is
that a prospective justice is not subjected to full scrutiny by the
press and by the public. Until a nomination is announced, the
press and the public have often provided information on a nomi-
nee's background that the administration has not ferreted out.
Many of the most important revelations concerning Haynsworth
and Carswell, for example, came from members of the public and
the press.' 10 The Senate therefore has resources to aid its investi-
gation that the administration lacks.' 0 2
Review of ethical qualifications has led to several of the Senate's
most detailed investigations of nominees. For example, in investi-
gating charges that Haynsworth had participated improperly in
cases involving corporations in which he owned stock, the Senate
interviewed an expert on judicial ethics, Haynsworth's stockbroker,
one of Haynsworth's fellow judges from the Fourth Circuit, and
Haynsworth himself.' 0 3 The Judiciary Committee also interviewed
the chairman of the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
of the American Bar Association, which in turn had interviewed
Haynsworth's judicial colleagues, a cross section of district judges
and lawyers in the Fourth Circuit, and Haynsworth himself.0
While investigating Blackmun, the committee reviewed opinion
letters from the deputy attorney general, the American Bar Associ-
ation, and a judge from the Eighth Circuit.10 5 The committee's
probe into charges that Rehnquist had intimidated black voters
concentrated heavily on affidavits and testimony by avowed eye
101. For example, the revelations about Carswell's 1948 speech and the transfer of the
golf course originated with an enterprising reporter for a Jacksonville radio station. R. HAR-
RIS, supra note 73, at 26-27; See also 210 THE NATION 450 (1970).
102. Although presidents often make public the names of persons who are under consid-
eration, the full glare of public scrutiny usually does not come to bear until one person is
nominated officially.
103. Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 236, 363, 270 (testimony of Randolph
Phillips, Chairman, Comm. for a Fair, Honest, and Impartial Judiciary).
104. Id. at 137.
105. Hearings on Blackmun, supra note 77, at 18, 26, 30 (testimony of Hon. Harrison L.
Winter, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).
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witnesses. 106 The Judiciary Committee also has relied on FBI in-
vestigations of nominees.10 7
IV. PREVENTION OF FAVORITISM
The second duty of the Senate which the Framers specifically
identified, the duty to safeguard against presidential favoritism, is
related closely to the Senate's duty to ensure the nominee's profes-
sional fitness. During the constitutional debates, the Framers
warned against the appointment of presidential favorites because
they feared that such favorites would be unqualified. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the Senate seldom has demonstrated any aversion
to presidential favorites per se, provided that they have been rea-
sonably well qualified.
Three types of favoritism must be distinguished: personal favor-
itism, political favoritism, and demographic favoritism. Personal
favoritism occurs when a president nominates a personal friend or
close associate. Political favoritism involves the appointment of
someone who has provided important services to the president, his
program, or party. Such an appointment is a reward for past fidel-
ity and sometimes is made in the expectation that the nominee
would favor the president's programs while on the Court. Demo-
graphic favoritism arises when the president appoints a member of
a particular geographic, religious, or ethnic group from which he
seeks support, or which he wishes to have represented on the
Court.
The nomination of presidential friends, although not a routine
practice, has been far from uncommon. These nominations rarely
have raised senatorial eyebrows because most nominees have been
exceptionally well qualified. For example, the nomination of David
106. Hearings on Rehnquist, supra note 83, at 101-06; Hearings on Rehnquist and Pow-
ell, supra note 92, at 320, 290, 293; see N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1971, at 31, col. 2.
107. E.g., Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 8. Because investigations are so impor-
tant, the Senate should make certain that it does not rush confirmation proceedings. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 4, at 136. The 99th Congress adopted a timetable designed to ensure that
there will be adequate opportunity for a thorough investigation even of seemingly routine
nominations, and it provided extra time for those meriting special attention. Mathias, Ad-
vice & Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54
U. CI. L. REv. 200, 206 (1986). As former Senator Mathias has observed, "[u]nlike legisla-
tion, action on a judicial nomination processed in haste cannot be revisited and refined at
leisure." Id.
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Davis, Lincoln's friend, executor, and 1860 presidential campaign
manager, encountered no significant opposition because Davis was
well qualified. 0 8 Similarly, Kennedy's selections of Bryon White,
an old Navy buddy, and Arthur Goldberg, a personal and political
adviser, inspired no significant concern about favoritism because
both White and Goldberg possessed outstanding professional cre-
dentials.10 9 The brilliant background of Abe Fortas likewise
blunted charges of favoritism when Johnson named him to the
Court in 1965, even though senators questioned Fortas in detail
about his close ties with the president. 110
But when a nominee's credentials are not particularly distin-
guished, personal favoritism becomes an issue. The Senate opposed
all four of Truman's nominees on charges of "cronyism" because
none of them were known as bright legal talents."' Similarly,
many senators expressed misgivings over Johnson's nomination of
his old Texas friend, Homer Thornberry, whose record in Congress
and on the federal bench was less outstanding than was his per-
sonal devotion to the president."2
In addition to concerns about professional fitness, a second ob-
jection to the nomination of presidential friends is that the friend
will consult the president on matters that come before the Court or
allow the president to influence his vote. Most commentators
agree, for example, that Justice Vinson violated the doctrine of
separation of powers when he advised President Truman in 1952
that the Court would rule in the administration's favor if the presi-
dent seized the nation's steel mills." 3 It may be more than coinci-
108. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 118-19. For a full discussion of the circumstances sur-
rounding Davis's appointment, see C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 817-29 (1974) (Volume V of the Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes Devise).
109. Id. at 274-77.
110. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Abe Fortas,
of Tennessee, to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 41-50 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings on Fortas]. Considerable criticism of
Fortas's close ties to Johnson occurred during the floor debate on the nomination. See 111
CONG. REC. 18827-28, 20054-55, 20068-69, 20072-73 (1965).
111. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 238.
112. Id. at 286.
113. See R. DONOVAN, TUMULTUOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY TRUMAN 1949-1953,
at 386 (1982).
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dence that the three justices who upheld Truman's position in the
Steel Seizure Case were all Truman appointees. 14
Johnson's attempt to elevate Fortas to the position of Chief Jus-
tice in 1968 ignited a firestorm of criticism because Fortas was re-
ported to have been in almost daily contact with Johnson during
his three years on the Court."" Fortas said at his original confirma-
tion hearings in 1965 that his relationship with Johnson had been
"exaggerated out of all connections with reality. 11 6 Once on the
Court, however, Fortas helped Johnson with such important
projects as the drafting of his 1966 State of the Union message and
his address to the nation during the Detroit riots in July 1967. In-
deed, Fortas reportedly acted as one of Johnson's closest advisers
on a wide range of foreign and domestic matters. Fortas's categori-
cal denial that he ever discussed Court business with Johnson" 7
did little to quell criticism. Senator Griffin declared that "the doc-
trine of separation of powers is the most fundamental concept em-
bodied in our Constitution and . . . its preservation is crucial to
the survival of free government," and concluded that "those who
assume positions of high responsibility in any of the three
branches of our Government have no license to ignore this funda-
mental principle which is at the core of our system."" s
The Senate rightly was concerned about Justice Fortas's inti-
mate association with President Johnson. The relationship easily
could have influenced Fortas's decisions, especially on matters con-
cerning the administration. Although Fortas could have recused
himself in matters on which he had advised the president, Senator
Griffin accurately pointed out that such recusal unfairly would de-
114. M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 188-91, 197 (1977).
115. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Abe Fortas,
of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the United States and Nomination of Homer
Thornberry, of Texas, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1968) [hereinafter Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry]. In his defense,
Fortas insisted that he "very seldom" advised Johnson on any matters. Id. at 104.
116. Hearings on Fortas, supra note 110, at 50 (testimony of Abe Fortas).
117. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 104. Fortas said that since
he became a justice, Johnson "never, directly or indirectly, approximately or remotely,
talked to me about anything before the Court or that might come before the Court. I want
to make that absolutely clear." Id. Again, Fortas stated that "I have never, never been asked
by the President. Nor have I expressed by [sic] views on any pending or decided
case-never, senator, never." Id. at 183.
118. Id. at 47.
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prive the nation of the services of one of only nine justices. 119 More
significantly, the doctrine of separation of powers clearly precludes
close contact between the White House and the Marble Palace. As
Professor Black pointed out in his essay on the Senate's role in the
confirmation process, the "judges are not the President's people
. . . .They are to be independent of him as they are of the Senate,
neither more nor less."'
20
The Senate's pronounced disgust over the favoritism inherent in
the Fortas and Thornberry nominations may have discouraged
cronyism. Although both Presidents Nixon and Reagan have made
no secret that political considerations weighed heavily in their se-
lections, no nominee since 1968 has been close to the president
personally. The history of the Convention and the dangers of
cronyism demonstrate that the Senate should scrutinize very care-
fully any presidential friend who is nominated to the Supreme
Court. 2 '
The second species of favoritism, political favoritism, also has
become rare in recent years. Except for William Rehnquist in 1971,
no nominee to the Court since Arthur Goldberg in 1962 has been a
member of the administration. The objections to nominations as a
reward for past services or in expectation of support from the
Court resemble the objections to personal favoritism. Just as the
Supreme Court should not be a retirement home for party war-
horses, the president should not appoint justices who will promote
the party line from the High Court bench. Although the life tenure
of justices affords them a measure of independence, residual fealty
to the administration, as with three of Truman's four appointees in
119. Id. at 50. Because Johnson already had announced that he would not be a candidate
for reelection, however, the dangers posed by the Johnson-Fortas relationship would not
have affected Fortas's service as Chief Justice adversely for any substantial period of time.
In any event, Fortas's nomination was defeated-more because of conservative opposition to
his decisions and Republican hopes of an electoral victory in November than because of
concern over Fortas's ties to Johnson. See, e.g., D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 91-92 (1985).
120. Black, supra note 4, at 660.
121. As Senator Robert Griffin stated at the Fortes hearings in 1968, "The argument has
been advanced that if a 'crony'-nominated because he is a crony-is 'qualified', he should
be approved. I reject such a view because it demeans the Senate and the Supreme Court."
Griffin later suggested that the Senate should confirm a confidant only if it was satisfied
that he was one of the "best qualified" for appointment to the Supreme Court. Hearings on
Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 47, 50.
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the Steel Seizure Case, compromises the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Moreover, justices who have close political associations with the
president might follow the party line because they hope to attain
that one political office which outranks a Supreme Court justice-
ship. Chief Justice Chase, for example, harbored presidential ambi-
tions,122 and Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the Court in
1916 to accept the Republican nomination for president. Justice
William 0. Douglas was touted in 1944 as a running mate for
Franklin Roosevelt, who announced shortly before the Democratic
convention that he would be pleased to run with either Truman or
Douglas. 123 In 1948, Douglas was Truman's first choice as a run-
ning mate, but Douglas declined the offer of a place on what
seemed to be a doomed ticket. 124 Uninhibited about tapping the
Court for political talent, Truman promised to support Chief Jus-
tice Vinson for the Democratic nomination in 1952.125 Earl Warren,
who had sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1948
and 1952, prior to his appointment to the Court in 1953, was men-
tioned widely in late 1955 and early 1956 as a likely successor to
the ailing Eisenhower. 126
Although the evidence does not suggest that political ambitions
influenced the judicial performance of these men, the danger re-
mains that a politically well-connected justice may leave the Court
to seek public office. For example, James Byrnes, a Democratic
stalwart whose appointment to the Court was a consolation prize
for his failure to receive the Democratic vice-presidential nomina-
tion in 1940, left the Court after barely one year to become a
122. E.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 99, at 225.
123. E.g., B. COCHRAN, HARRY TRUMAN AND THE CRISIS PRESIDENCY 15-17 (1973); W. DOUG-
LAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-75, at 283 (1980). Douglas admitted in his memoirs that "[a]n
FDR 'draft' would have been difficult to resist. I am glad I never had to face up to it in
1944." Id. at 283-84.
124. See J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 275 (1958); J.
SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 257-75 (1980).
125. A. HAMBY, BEYOND THE NEW DEAL: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM 481-
82 (1973). Vinson seriously deliberated a campaign for the presidency, but eventually de-
clined Truman's support because of failing health. Id.
126. J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 183 (1979). Eisen-
hower's physical recovery and his resolution to seek a second term ended all speculation
about a Warren candidacy in 1956. Id.
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Roosevelt adviser.127 Similarly, Arthur Goldberg's close connection
to Democratic Party politics led him to yield to President John-
son's intense pressure to leave the Court to become Ambassador to
the United Nations. 12 Such short tenures are undesirable. Most
justices need a few years to adjust to their jobs, and continuity of
membership gives the Court's decisions predictability and coher-
ence. Accordingly, the Senate should scrutinize specially a nominee
whose political background suggests that he or she will not serve a
long tenure on the Court. 29
Despite the dangers of political favoritism, the Senate has shown
a high tolerance for nominations that repay political debts. For ex-
ample, all of Franklin Roosevelt's nominees, with the exception of
Wiley Rutledge, had provided key support for New Deal legislation
or policies. Although some foes of the New Deal complained that
Roosevelt's appointments were too political, few accused him of fa-
voritism because most of his nominees enjoyed outstanding profes-
sional reputations. Moreover, the Senate displayed similar defer-
ence to Truman's nominees, all of whom had done yeoman's work
for the Democratic Party, even though none of them had distin-
guished credentials.
Similarly, the Senate often has countenanced demographic fa-
voritism. Since the earliest days of the Republic, when Washington
made a special point of naming one justice for each region of the
country,130 the Senate generally has seen no harm in allowing the
president to consider geography, or even religion or race, as a fac-
tor in selecting a nominee, provided that the nominee is otherwise
qualified. In 1956, for example, President Eisenhower was widely
praised for appointing a Roman Catholic, William Brennan, at a
time when the Court had no Roman Catholic members.' 3' More
recently, as the nation's geographic and religious divisions have
grown less pronounced, presidents and the Senate have paid less
127. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 14-16.
128. Id. at 259-62.
129. John P. Frank has observed that "[tihe Constitution was intended to free the Jus-
tices to satisfy just one ambition, the ambition to do a good judicial job. As Chief Justice
Waite said in 1876, 'certainly no man should have the place who is willing to exchange it for
another.'" J. FRANK, supra note 124, at 279.
130. Id. at 71.
131. Id. at 245.
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attention to the geographic and religious balance of the Court.
Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan, for example, did not restore
the Court's so-called "Jewish seat," which has remained vacant
since Fortas's resignation in 1969. Geographic balance has become
so unimportant that Nixon appointed two justices from Minnesota
and Reagan did not hesitate to name a second Arizonan.132 Con-
cern for geographical and religious balance has given way to a con-
cern for racial and sexual balance. Just as Johnson acknowledged
that race was a primary consideration in his appointment of Mar-
shall in 1967,133 so Reagan's appointment of O'Connor in 1981 ful-
filled his campaign promise to appoint a woman. 3 4
V. EVALUATION OF PHILOSOPHY
Although the Framers did not discuss the issue, consideration of
a nominee's social, political, judicial, and economic views has be-
come an integral part of the appointment process. The Senate's
review of a nominee's personal views sometimes may shock the
public, embarrass senators, and offend some scholars; nevertheless,
the Senate has a duty as well as a right to inquire about such
views. At several hearings on nominees in recent years, the Judici-
ary Committee properly has been reminded of Oliver Wendell
Holmes's remark that the beliefs of judges are "the secret root
from which the law draws all the juice of life.' 35 Because the
Court's justices "[a]re not abstract and impersonal oracles, but are
men whose views are necessarily, though by no conscious intent,
affected by inheritance, education and environment and by the im-
pact of history past and present,"'3 6 the Senate would abdicate its
132. Between 1981, when Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona became a justice, and 1986,
when Warren Burger of Minnesota resigned as Chief Justice, four of the Court's nine mem-
bers were from Arizona and Minnesota. The combined population of these states is only
about three percent of the total population of the nation.
133. See, e.g., Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 5.
134. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1981, at Al, col. 6, A12, col. 2.
135. Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 444 (testimony of Prof. Gary
Orfield);
136. Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 562 (testimony of Charles Warren). As
Felix Frankfurter observed, many words and phrases in the Constitution are so undefined
that they "leave the individual Justice free, if indeed they do not actually compel him, to fill
in the vacuum with his own controlling notions of economic, social and industrial facts with
reference to which they are invoked." F. FRANKFURTER, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform,
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constitutionally ordained role as an essential partner in the ap-
pointment process if it failed to review the political and judicial
philosophies of nominees. As Professor Black observes, the pro-
position that the Senate should not consider a nominee's political
views "amounts to an assertion that the authority that must 'ad-
vise and consent' to a nomination ought not to be guided by con-
siderations which are hugely important in the making of the nomi-
nation. ' 137 Even though senators can never accurately predict how
a nominee's ideology might change after he or she has donned judi-
cial robes, pre-appointment predictions are not entirely lacking in
prescience. The Senate would be remiss if it did not even attempt
to consider how a nominee's ideology might affect his or her per-
formance on the Court.' 8 As Professor Lively points out, "The ar-
gument that policy-oriented debate concerning a Supreme Court
nominee demeans the candidate and the Court. . . ignores a well-
established constitutional principle favoring precisely such a focus.
It reflects a misplaced notion that somehow selection of judges is
supposed to be above politics." '39
The history of confirmation proceedings demonstrates that the
Senate has been concerned about the political views of nominees.
In a few instances, senators have admitted rather frankly that po-
litical considerations influenced their vote. In 1930, for example, a
number of liberal senators opposed Charles Evans Hughes because
of his close association with big business. 40 Later that year, oppo-
nents of Judge Parker cited his decisions ruling against labor un-
ions."" So far as possible, however, the Senate has tried to mask
its partisan interests with appeals to fundamental values. Thus,
opponents of Hughes contended that he elevated property rights
in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND
THE CONSTITUTION 163 (P. Kurland ed. 1970).
137. Black, supra note 4, at 658; see also Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note
92, at 303 where Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., stated that "if the President is making his decisions on
an ideological bent, the Senate ... has a right to do likewise."
138. But cf. Friedman, supra note 4, at 1291-1320.
139. Lively, supra note 4, at 575.
140. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 73 (1958).
141. Mendelsohn, supra note 89; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on
Nomination of John J. Parker to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., passim (1930).
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over human rights. 42 In opposing Parker in 1930, Senator George
Norris stated that "[w]hen we are passing on a judge, therefore, we
not only ought to know whether he is a good lawyer, not only
whether he is honest. ., but we ought to know how he approaches
the great questions of human liberty.' 143 In 1955, a number of sen-
ators opposed Harlan because they contended that he would jeop-
ardize national sovereignty by elevating international treaties over
the Constitution.14 4
The nomination of Potter Stewart in 1958 marked the beginning
of an era in which conservative senators made adherence to the
principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis the litmus test for
nominees. Embittered by the Court's desegregation decisions and a
recent line of holdings in national security cases, conservative
southern senators demanded to know whether Stewart regarded
himself as a "creative judge," whether he believed that the Consti-
tution had the same meaning as it had in 1787, and whether he
would honor the doctrine of stare decisis. 45 During the 1960s,
southern conservatives subjected several other nominees, most no-
tably Marshall and Fortas, to similar questions as the Supreme
Court continued to shatter precedents in such areas as race rela-
tions, criminal procedure, and legislative apportionment. After the
election of Nixon in 1968, however, the liberals in the Senate more
than any other group queried nominees about their views on fun-
damental issues. Whereas the conservatives regarded judicial re-
straint as the sine qua non for confirmation, the liberals believed
that commitment to certain civil liberties was crucial. During the
hearings on Rehnquist in 1971, for example, Senator Birch Bayh
declared that the most important quality for the Senate to con-
142. W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LE-
GALITY 1889-1932, at 298 (1969).
143. 72 CONG. REC. 8192 (1930). Norris contended that "we ought to know that every one
who ascends to that holy bench should have in his heart and in his mind the intention of
looking after the liberties of his fellow citizens." Id. See also R. Lowirr, GEORGE W. NORRIS:
THE PERSISTENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE 1913-1933, at 438-39 (1971).
144. E.g., 101 CONG. REC. 3015-19 (1955) (statement of Sen. James Eastland); id. at 3029
(statement of Sen. William E. Jenner); id. at 3035-36 (statement of Sen. Olin D. Johnston).
145. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Potter Stew-
art to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
16, 20, 26 (1959) [hereinafter Hearings on Stewart].
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sider was "a demonstrated commitment to fundamental human
rights.1' 46 Bayh explained that
[t]he great struggle of our time has been to secure equal justice
under law for all citizens. It goes without saying that demon-
strated insensitivity to the problems of inequality and discrimi-
nation should disqualify a candidate for the Court. No person
should be put on the Court whose views are inconsistent with
securing equal rights and equal opportunity for all regardless of
race, religion, creed, national origin or sex. And equally impor-
tant are the fundamental liberties of the Bill of Rights. Thus, a
nominee should also have a record which shows that he is com-
mitted to preserving those basic individual freedoms.1 47
During a number of hearings and debates over the past fifteen
years, liberals have expressed the view that the Senate should not
confirm a nominee whose views would be "harmful" to the coun-
try.14 These senators generally have defined "harm" as opposition
to their own understanding of human equality and their interpre-
tation of the Bill of Rights. This test of "harmfulness" stems from
a 1970 article by Professor Black, who wrote in the wake of the
Haynsworth and Carswell nominations that a senator should vote
against a nominee "if he firmly believes on reasonable grounds,
that a nominee's views on the large issues of the day will make it
harmful to the country to sit and vote on the Court." '149 Professor
Black concluded that a senator has no duty "to vote for a man
whose views on great questions the Senator believes to make him
dangerous as a judge." 150 More recently, and in a similar vein,
Professors Tribe and Kurland wrote that the Senate has an
obligation to assure itself that a nominee's substantive views of
law are within the broad bounds of acceptability in American
146. 117 CONG. REC. 44741 (1971).
147. Id.
148. For example, Senator John Tunney stated at the Rehnquist hearings in 1971 that
where the President deems it appropriate to change entirely the character of
the Supreme Court, changing it to his own image, the Senate has the right to
reject the nominee on the grounds that his views on the large issues of the day
will make it harmful to the country were he to sit and vote on the Court.
Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 75.
149. Black, supra note 4, at 657.
150. Id. at 659.
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life and not on its lunatic fringes-whether left or right. The
Republic may demand-and its senators ought therefore to en-
sure-that its life-tenured judiciary does not disdain the Bill of
Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment's command for equal pro-
tection of the laws and due process."'
Although the formulations *of Professors Black, Tribe, and Kur-
land represent a useful and reasoned effort to define a constitu-
tionally appropriate means of accommodating political reality in
evaluating a nominee's philosophy, their test, as applied in a
cruder form by senators, suffers from certain limitations. The word
"harmful" and phrases such as "broad bounds of acceptability"
and "lunatic fringe" are inherently ambiguous. An intellectually
honest senator might well believe that a nominee whose philosoph-
ical bent differed from his or her own would be harmful to the
country; yet few senators would-or should-oppose a nominee
merely because the nominee occupies a place on the political spec-
trum a bit to the left or right of his or her own. In this sense, the
word "harmful" provides too broad a basis for opposing a nominee.
Professors Black, Tribe, and Kurland have properly disavowed
such a broad interpretation.152 If, however, the word refers to views
which might subvert the republican foundations of the nation,
-then the definition is too narrow. No president ever has nominated
a candidate harmful in that sense, nor is one likely to appoint such
a candidate. Because even unsuccessful nominees always have won
substantial numbers of votes in the Senate153 as well as significant
support from federal judges, the bar, and the public,1 54 no nominee
151. Kurland & Tribe, supra note 63, at 3. For a more complete discussion of Professor
Tribe's views on the role of ideology in the Senate's confirmation of Supreme Court nomi-
nees, see L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 93-124.
152. Black, supra note 4, at 658; Kurland & Tribe, supra note 63.
153. The Senate defeated Carswell's nomination, for example, by a vote of 45 to 51,
Haynsworth's by a vote of 45 to 55, and Parker's by a vote of 39 to 41. The votes also often
were narrow on unsuccessful nominees during the nineteenth century. In 1894 the Senate
rejected Peckham by 32 to 41 and Hornblower by 24 to 30. The Senate defeated the nomi-
nation of Hoar in 1870 by a vote of 24 to 33, and rejected Black in 1860 by a vote of 25 to
26. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, passim.
154. See, e.g., Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91.
1987] 663
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ever has held views that fell outside the "broad bounds of
acceptability."' 55
Moreover, a test based upon "broad bounds of acceptability" or
"harmfulness" may suggest to senators that they may measure a
nominee's ideology by a roughly objective standard. In reality,
however, the existence of any consensus about what is a "reasona-
ble" ideology is problematical. 156 Moreover, the illusion of such a
consensus may encourage a senator to delude him or herself into
believing that his or her vote on a nominee is based upon transcen-
dent values when in fact it represents a subjective political
decision.
A senator may properly base his or her vote upon subjective po-
litical choices, however, if that decision is based upon a broad view
of the nominee's record and ideas and a broad vision of the Consti-
tution, rather than upon narrowly partisan or evanescent issues. 57
Accordingly, Senator Bayh's insistence upon fidelity to a broadly
libertarian interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment would provide a sound test for any senator who fa-
vored such an interpretation. Likewise, a more conservative sena-
tor who favored a less expansive interpretation of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment could properly oppose a
nominee whose views were broadly more libertarian.
155. Professor Friedman has observed that there have been few, if any, nominees whose
views were so abhorrent that they were beyond the realm of rational political discourse in
the nation. Friedman, supra note 4, at 1284, 1319.
156. But cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 96.
157. Because justices usually serve a lengthy tenure and rule on a wide array of issues,
there is agreement that a senator should not base his or her vote on a nominee's position on
one issue. As Professor Stephen Gillers told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at the
O'Connor hearings:
People sit on the Court for 10, 20, some in excess of 30 years. A nominee who is
pressed with regard to an issue that may be emerging today, may be sitting on
the Court long, long after that issue is forgotten. It . . .is shortsighted in the
extreme to emphasize a particular current issue over a nominee's character,
history, intellect, judgment ....
Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 388-89. Or, as Senator Kennedy stated, "It is ...
offensive to suggest that a potential Justice. . .must pass the litmus test of any single-issue
interest group." Likewise, Professor Tribe has aptly argued that "if the President in-
sists-unwisely and improperly-on nominating only those who express a politically ap-
proved view of a single issue, such as the 'right to life' or school prayer, or only those who
are found acceptable by a specific political or moral constituency, then each Senator has a
special duty not to confirm." L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 98.
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In applying this standard, it is important to emphasize again
that the senator must recognize that his or her criteria are subjec-
tive. The dissenting members of the Judiciary Committee seemed
to recognize this in their report opposing the nomination of Rehn-
quist in 1971. They stated:
Under any theory of the Senate's task, our role inescapably in-
cludes weighing the nominee's attitude toward the fundamental
values of our constitutional system: limits on government power,
individual liberty, human equality. A man takes what he is, and
believes, to the bench. Ultimately, it may be less important to
debate the meaning of judicial philosophy than simply to ac-
knowledge the inherent strand of discretion in judicial deci-
sion-especially Constitutional interpretation. The best inten-
tions of restraint cannot erase the elements of value and
judgment involved when the Court applies the majestic generali-
ties of the Fourteenth Amendment .... 158
A refusal by the Senate to admit frankly that policy considera-
tions influence its attitude toward the nominee creates a charade
in which the Senate's focus on issues such as personal integrity and
judicial temperament conceals concern over the nominee's political
views. For example, the conservative senators who interrogated
such nominees as Stewart, Fortas, and Marshall about their views
on judicial restraint were less concerned with fidelity to precedent
than they were fearful that the nominees would construe the Con-
stitution to promote liberal positions on issues such as criminal
procedure and civil rights. 159 Similarly, much of the concern ex-
pressed over the competence and temperament of Carswell and the
integrity of Haynsworth and Rehnquist masked objections to their
ideology.160 Such hypocrisy impugns the reputation of the nominee
and demeans the integrity of the Senate.'6 ' As Professor Lively has
observed:
158. 117 CONG. REC. 44,766 (1971).
159. At his confirmation hearings in 1968, Fortas reminded Senator Sam Ervin that Ervin
himself had voted to overturn a recent precedent when Ervin served on the North Carolina
Supreme Court and that Ervin had written in that decision that "the doctrine of stare deci-
sis will not be applied. . . to preserve and perpetuate error and grievous wrongs." Hearings
on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 110 (statement of Abe Fortas).
160. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
161. As McConnell concludes:
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Whenever the Senate . . . obscures its true motives, it is a
proper subject of criticism for fostering a process that demeans
itself as well as the object of its true motive. Denigration is bet-
ter avoided, the public better served, and constitutional man-
dates better fulfilled not by abandoning robust political debate,
but by embracing it candidly.162
VI. QUESTIONING OF THE NOMINEE
As part of the Senate's probe into the fitness of a nominee and
its evaluation of a nominee's political views, the Judiciary Commit-
tee solicits the testimony of the nominee. The Senate's interroga-
tion of nominees is a relatively new function of the Senate's confir-
mation process. No nominee testified before the Senate until 1925,
when Harlan Fiske Stone appeared before the Judiciary Commit-
tee in order to defend his investigation as Attorney General into
the conduct of Senator Burton Wheeler.163 Although Stone's ap-
pearance before the Judiciary Committee was a "complete suc-
cess,"16' 4 his testimony did not establish a custom, and three de-
cades passed before testimony by a nominee became an established
practice. The testimony of the few nominees appearing before the
Judiciary Committee between 1925 and the 1950s was limited to
questions about the nominee's past actions.16 5 The committee did
not question nominees about judicial philosophy or their opinions
on legal issues. One nominee, Sherman Minton, declined an invita-
tion to appear;1 6 6 and Felix Frankfurter agreed to testify only
about his past actions, explaining that
A pattern emerges running from Rutledge and Taney through Brandeis and
Parker up to and including Haynsworth and Carswell in which the Senate has
employed deception to achieve its partisan goals. The deception has been to
ostensibly object to a nominee's fitness while in fact the opposition is born of
political expedience.
McConnell, supra note 3, at 13.
162. Lively, supra note 4, at 575.
163. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 188-97 (1956).
164. Id. at 197.
165. See generally Thorpe, The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 18 J. Pua. L. 371 (1969) (discussing the questioning of Su-
preme Court nominees from 1925 to 1969).
166. Minton explained in a letter to the committee that "personal participation by the
nominee in the committee proceedings relating to his nomination presents a serious ques-
tion of propriety, particularly when I might be required to express my views on highly con-
troversial and litigious issues affecting the Court." 95 CONG. REC. 13,803 (1949).
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[m]y attitude and outlook on relevant matters have been fully
expressed over a period of years and are easily accessible. I
should think it not only in bad taste but inconsistent with the
duties of the office for which I have been nominated for me to
attempt to supplant my past record by personal declarations.1 67
Starting with Harlan in 1955, however, every nominee has testi-
fied before the committee and most have been questioned about
their judicial philosophy and at least some current legal issues. In-
deed, the Senate's questioning of nominees has evolved into an in-
tegral part of the confirmation process. The scope of such testi-
mony, however, has varied widely from nominee to nominee. In
many instances, it has been either perfunctory or concentrated on
narrow issues that reflect immediate political concerns. The clear
tendency, however, has been toward increasingly comprehensive
questions. In 1955, for example, the Judiciary Committee asked
Harlan primarily about his views on national sovereignty, a subject
brought to the fore by a temporary recrudescence of isolationism.
The 1957 hearings on Brennan also were narrowly focused. Bren-
nan was perhaps the last target of the sharp tongue of Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy, 168 who interrogated Brennan about speeches in
which Brennan had condemned the excessive zeal of investigations
such as those conducted by McCarthy.169 Perhaps embarrassed by
McCarthy's hectoring of Brennan, other senators had few ques-
tions for the nominee. Even southern conservatives limited them-
selves to a few questions about constitutional interpretation as it
related to the Court's recent rulings on desegregation.
Southern conservatives made up for lost time two years later,
however, when they examined Stewart in detail about his theories
on constitutional interpretation and his opinions on desegregation.
Later that year, however, the committee spent much less time
questioning Charles Whittaker, whose conservative judicial record
167. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Felix
Frankfurter to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 108 (1939) [hereinafter Hearings on Frankfurter].
168. McCarthy died three months after the hearings.
169. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of William
Joseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-28 (1957) [hereinafter Hearings on Brennan].
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apparently appeased southern conservatives. 7 ' Similarly, in 1962
the committee spent little time questioning Byron White, who tes-
tified that "I think it is clear under the Constitution that legisla-
tive power is not vested in the Supreme Court.' 7'1 The committee
devoted more attention to Goldberg because his record of liberal
activism worried some senators.7 2 During the Marshall hearings in
1967 and the Fortas and Thornberry hearings in 1968, however,
senators questioned the nominees intensively about a wide range of
issues, especially desegregation, criminal procedure, and reappor-
tionment.17 3 These were the first hearings to cover so broad a
gamut of public issues. When Warren E. Burger appeared to tes-
tify in 1969, however, the committee again confined itself to only a
few questions. 74
Although the Senate interrogated the next several nomi-
nees-Haynsworth, Carswell and Blackmun-more extensively, the
questions primarily addressed the nominees' ethical and moral fit-
ness rather than public issues.7 5 The committee questioned Rehn-
quist, Powell, and Stevens more broadly. The queries to Stevens,
for instance, concerned the issues of capital punishment, wiretap-
170. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Charles
Evans Whittaker to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The brevity of the Senate's questioning of Whittaker led William
Rehnquist to complain that the committee had
succeeded in adducing only the following facts: (a) proceeds from skunk trap-
ping in rural Kansas assisted him in obtaining his early education; (b) he was
both fair and able in his decisions as a judge of the lower federal courts; (c) he
was the first Missourian ever appointed to the Supreme Court; (d) since he had
been born in Kansas but now resided in Missouri, his nomination honored two
states.
Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 7-8.
171. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Byron R.
White, of Colorado, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1962) [hereinafter Hearings on White].
172. Hearings on Goldberg, supra note 67, at 7-14, 43-44, 56, 63-65.
173. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, passim; Hearings on Marshall,
supra note 87, passim.
174. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Warren E.
Burger, of Virginia, to be Chief Justice of the United States, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)
[hereinafter Hearings on Burger].
175. See Hearings on Blackmun, supra note 77, passim; Hearings on Carswell, supra
note 70, passim.
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ping, prior restraints on the news media, gender discrimination,
the exclusionary rule, and the Court's jurisdiction.171
The committee's most comprehensive examination occurred in
1981, when it solicited the views of Sandra Day O'Connor on more
than fifty different issues. In addition to asking questions on such
familiar topics as the exclusionary rule, capital punishment, school
prayer, and constitutional interpretation, 177 the Senate also raised
several issues rarely, if ever, discussed at nomination hearings. The
committee asked about venue rules, diversity jurisdiction, judicial
salaries, rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, judicial training pro-
grams, life tenure for Supreme Court justices, court delays, the
constitutional implications of administrative regulations, the crea-
tion of specialty courts, and Supreme Court press conferences. 178
Committee members also questioned her about such social and po-
litical issues as the right to keep and bear arms, cruel and unusual
punishment, homosexuality, and notification to parents regarding
distribution of contraceptives to their children. 79 The questioning
of Rehnquist in 1986 was narrow by comparison, but the commit-
tee again raised a broad range of issues. Scalia was also questioned
about a fairly broad range of issues, including abortion, the Mi-
randa rule, and affirmative action. 80
The personal appearances of nominees serve three functions.
The most obvious is to help senators evaluate nominees' social, po-
litical, and judicial views in order to make a reasoned decision on
confirmation. A second, related function is to provide nominees
with an opportunity to respond to any charges impugning their
character, competence, or any other aspect of their record. A third
purpose is to facilitate an exchange of ideas between the senators
and the nominees.
176. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 27, 46, 31, 56-57, 77, 45.
177. Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 79, 128, 132-33, 82-86.
178. Id. at 153-54, 92-93, 212-13, 130, 97, 136-37, 210-11, 155-56, 203-04, 112.
179. Id. at 134-35, 161, 247, 246-47.
180. Hearings on Rehnquist, supra note 83, 132-373; Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary on Nomination of Antonin Scalia to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 34, 45 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on
Scalia]. The Senate's query of Scalia, however, was less detailed than its questioning of
O'Connor in 1981. The reason may be that the Senate expended so much time and energy
on the interrogation and investigation of Rehnquist.
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Although the first function is the most obvious and is frequently
cited as a reason for a nominee's testimony, it is probably the least
important. As Professor Powe has observed, "Senate questioning
has proved astonishingly ineffective in eliciting the desired infor-
mation."'' The questioning presents a conflict between the Sen-
ate's right to elicit a nominee's views, and the nominee's duty to
refuse to make any statement that would prejudice his or her ser-
vice on the Court.'82 Although senators often have pressed nomi-
nees for specific views, nominees just as often have refused to an-
swer, contending that to answer would compromise the Court's
integrity. The result of this conflict is an impasse which has frus-
trated senators and exasperated nominees. In 1967, southern sena-
tors tried for two days to extract comments from Thurgood Mar-
shall regarding the fifth amendment's prohibition of compelled
self-incrimination in the wake of the Court's controversial decision
in Miranda v. Arizona.183 Marshall refused to answer, although he
was willing to state generally that he opposed involuntary confes-
sions and that he did not believe Miranda had contributed to an
increase in crime. The following exchange illustrates the stalemate
characterizing the Senate's attempts to elicit the opinions of nomi-
nees on controversial public issues:
Senator ERVIN. [I]f you are not going to answer a question
about anything which might possibly come before the Supreme
Court some time in the future, I cannot ask you a single ques-
tion about anything that is relevant to this inquiry.
Judge MARSHALL. All I am trying to say, Senator, is I do not
think you want me to be in the position of giving you a state-
ment on the fifth amendment, and then, if I am confirmed and
sit on the Court, when a fifth amendment case comes up, I will
have to disqualify myself.
Senator ERVIN. If you have no opinions on what the Constitu-
tion means at this time, you ought not to be confirmed. Any-
body that has been at the bar as long as you have, and has as
181. Powe, The Senate and the Court: Questioning a Nominee, 54 TEx. L. REv. 891, 893
(1976).
182. See Rees, Memorandum on the Proper Scope of Questioning of Supreme Court
Nominees at Senate Advice and Consent Hearings, in Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77,
at 174.
183. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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distinguished a legal career as you have, certainly ought to have
some very firm opinions about the meaning of the Constitution.
Judge MARSHALL. But as to particular language of a particu-
lar section that I know is going to come before the Court, I do
have an opinion as of this time. But I think it would be wrong
for me to give that opinion at this time. When the case comes
before the Court, that will be the time.184
Similarly, Rehnquist explained in 1971 that he could not answer
a question on searches and seizures because "there are several
cases pending up there now and I would anticipate that there
would be a number in the future."'85 Senator Tunney remarked in
frustration to Rehnquist that "[i]f it is impossible to probe your
thinking because you feel that. . . the issue might come before the
Supreme Court at some time, there is no way that we can go after
the process of thinking that you engage in."'' 8
The committee's questioning of nominees, however, need not
necessarily result in a stalemate if the senators are willing to
phrase their questions in general terms and if the nominees are
willing to provide general answers.18 7 Sandra Day O'Connor, for ex-
ample, shared her thoughts on a wide variety of issues, even while
she avoided specific comments that would have prejudiced her par-
ticipation on the Court. O'Connor limited herself to explaining the
importance of the issues about which she was questioned, reciting
in general terms the relevant state of the law.' Although
O'Connor's testimony may have provided little basis for the com-
mitte's evaluation, she at least demonstrated that she was con-
cerned, thoughtful, and informed about major problems facing
American society.
Despite their frequent refusals to answer certain questions, no
nominee since Minton has challenged the Senate's right to ask
184. Hearings on Marshall, supra note 87, at 53.
185. Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 157.
186. Id. at 75.
187. Whether a nominee should provide more specific answers to certain types of ques-
tions is a different issue which is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of this
issue, see Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation
Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and Assuaging the Fears
of the Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. - (1987) (forthcoming).
188. E.g., Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 163.
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such questions. William Rehnquist told the committee in 1971 that
he could "fully sense the problem you have, and surely you can
sense the problem that the nominee has, too." Rehnquist explained
that "I do not blame you for feeling you want something more spe-
cific than just a . . .pious declaration, and yet I find that when
one tries to elaborate specific they tend to be things no one would
disagree with or else we get into an area where the matter is likely
to come before the court in some form."189 The only ruling by the
committee that specifically addresses the dilemma reiterated that
the Senate may ask any question and the nominee may refuse to
answer any question. 90
Nominees have felt freer to discuss their judicial philosophies
than to discuss their views on particular issues. Nevertheless, such
testimony has generated little beyond what Rehnquist called "pi-
ous declarations." Every nominee since Stewart has abjured judi-
cial activism when asked about how flexibly the Court should in-
terpret the Constitution. 9" The answers are so perfunctory that
they reveal nothing about a nominee's performance on the Court.
When the committee asked Fortas, a highly political man and an
activist judge, to describe the circumstances under which the Court
should attempt to bring about social and economic change, he re-
plied, "Zero, absolutely zero."' 92 Fortas pointed out, however, that
the words of the Constitution are not "simple and clear and unmis-
takable in their meaning."' 93 This truism has been expounded by
strict constructionists and broad constructionists alike.
189. Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 41. Similarly, Fortas stated at
his hearings in 1968 that "I believe that this is an area in which there is truly a constitu-
tional dilemma. I believe that it is a dilemma for the committee as well as for the nominee".
Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 122.
190. Hearings on Stewart, supra note 145, at 41-60. In response to a point of order that
Senator Hennings raised suggesting that questions about state court decisions were im-
proper, Senator Eastland ruled that senators could ask any questions they liked, but that
the nominee was free to decline to answer any questions he or she thought improper. Sena-
tor Hennings withdrew his point of order after several senators expressed support for East-
land's ruling. Id.
191. See, e.g., Hearings on Blackmun, supra note 77, at 33, 35; Hearings on Fortas and
Thornberry, supra note 115, at 105-06, Hearings on Goldberg, supra note 67, at 8, Hearings
on Burger, supra note 174, at 6.
192. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 105-06.
193. Id. at 105.
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Not only does testimony by the nominees reveal little about
their views on public issues or judicial philosophy, but in most in-
stances such testimony is superfluous because the nominee's views
already are well known. If the nominee is an appellate judge, his or
her record speaks more authoritatively than the words he or she
might speak at a hearing. Additionally, like Frankfurter, most
nominees who are not judges have records on public issues "that
have been fully expressed over a number of years and are
accessible. '194
Notwithstanding its many shortcomings, testimony by nominees
serves important purposes. Even if a nominee's views generally are
well known, testimony can help to clarify particular aspects of the
nominee's public record. Indeed, a nominee's writings and speeches
may raise more questions about his or her philosophy than they
answer. William Rehnquist's reputation for conservatism prompted
many questions at his confirmation hearings in 1971, yet many of
his answers ameliorated concern that he was an extremist. Rehn-
quist explained, for example, that he supported Phoenix's Public
Accommodations Act, which he had opposed publicly prior to its
enactment in 1964.195 Rehnquist explained that the ordinance had
"really worked very well in Phoenix" and that "I have come to re-
alize. . . more than I did at the time, the strong concern that mi-
norities have for the recognition of these rights. I would not feel
the same way today about it as I did then."196 Rehnquist's answers
to other questions also demonstrated that his philosophy was tem-
pered by a respect for fundamental rights. Rehnquist's statement
that "any sort of electronic surveillance that would interfere with
the lawyer-client relationship of a defendant after he has been
charged would be very disturbing" pleased his questioner, Senator
Fong, who was "glad to hear that view. '197 Similarly, Senator Tun-
ney was "very happy" to hear Rehnquist explain that he "heartily"
favored increased availability of legal services for the poor.198 Al-
though Tunney still voted against him, Rehnquist's opportunity to
present himself as a humane and reasonable conservative may have
194. Hearings on Frankfurter, supra note 167.
195. Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 69-70, 155-56.
196. Id. at 70.
197. Id. at 143.
198. Id. at 189.
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changed votes. At the very least, the testimony helped clarify
Rehnquist's general philosophy.
Just as Rehnquist's testimony tempered his conservative reputa-
tion, so liberals sometimes have expressed support for certain con-
servative principles. In 1968, for example, Fortas pointed out that
he had dissented in Avery v. Midland County,199 the case in which
the Supreme Court applied the one-man, one-vote principle to
units of local government. 00
In addition to providing an opportunity to learn more about a
nominee's politics and philosophy, the hearings also allow the Sen-
ate to inquire about specific incidents or charges that emerge in
the confirmation process. For example, the Judiciary Committee
questioned both Haynsworth and Blackmun about their decisions
to participate as judges in cases involving corporations in which
they owned stock.21 Blackmun also was questioned about possible
conflicts of interest arising out of his service as executor of three
estates 0 2 and director of a corporation. 0'
The third purpose of a nominee's personal appearance before the
Judiciary Committee is to provide an opportunity for a direct ex-
change of ideas between senators and nominees. No other occasion
permits face-to-face dialogue between the legislative branch and
executive nominees for the judicial branch of government. The
nominee's appearance thus enables committee members to give the
nominee their views on a justice's proper constitutional role and to
share their opinions on constitutional law. In this sense, the Senate
"advises" the nominee him or herself as well as the president.0 4
199. 390 U.S. 474, 495 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 476; see Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 111.
201. Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 39-54; Hearings on Blackmun, supra
note 77, at 45-56.
202. Hearings on Blackmun, supra note 77, at 50-51.
203. Id. at 31-32. Similarly, the committee asked Goldberg about possible conflicts of in-
terest created by his position as counsel to the Steelworkers Union. Hearings on Goldberg,
supra note 67, at 12-14. Goldberg explained that he terminated his relationship with the
Union when he became Secretary of Labor in 1961 and that he even renounced his rights to
"a very substantial pension." Id. at 13. He also averred that he would not resume his ties to
the union if he returned to private practice. Id. at 13-14.
204. This use of the word "advice" differs from the original meaning of the term in article
II of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 2. Over the past 30 years, however, "ad-
vice" arguably has embraced this interpretation in addition to its original meaning.
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As with every other aspect of the confirmation process, the inter-
view may be abused by unscrupulous senators. In the words of one
observer, these dialogues "have tended on occasion to degenerate
into exercises in political flapdoodle that detract from the dignity
of both the Senate and the nominee."2°0 Joseph McCarthy ranted
at Brennan, and during the late 1950s and 1960s southern senators
often hectored nominees about their liberal views and sternly lec-
tured them about the constitutional role of the Court. When For-
tas appeared before the committee in 1968, for example, Senator
Ervin delivered a lengthy philippic concerning the Court's deci-
sions on criminal procedure and civil rights. In his monologue cov-
ering thirty-seven pages, Ervin expounded on judicial restraint and
critiqued various decisions in which Fortas had joined. 0 6 When
Ervin finished, Senator Thurmond badgered Fortas in an exchange
that consumed another sixty-seven pages in the committee's
report.10 7
Despite such excesses, senators should impart their views to
nominees-even if those views are imparted with passion-because
the Senate is no passive observer of the Court's work. During the
Warren Court years, for example, many senators, along with large
numbers of congressmen, state legislators, judges and private citi-
zens, vehemently objected to the Court's decisions on a broad spec-
trum of issues. In 1958, the Senate and House Judiciary Commit-
205. Graham, Marshall on the Stand, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1967, at El0, col. 1.
206. At one point, Ervin declaimed that the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), "illustrates an overweaning ... solicitude for the welfare of those accused
of crime, and it overlooks a very significant truth, that society and the victims of crime are
just as much entitled to justice as the accused." Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra
note 115, at 134-35.
207. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 218-19. Thurmond asked
Fortas the following questions about the Court's decision in Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957):
Does not that decision, Mallory-I want that word to ring in your
ears-Mallory-the man happened to be from my State, incidentally-shackle
law enforcement? Mallory, a man who raped a woman, admitted his guilt, and
the Supreme Court let him loose on a technicality .... Is not that type of
decision calculated to bring the courts and the law and the administration of
justice in [sic] disrepute? Is not that type of decision calculated to encourage
more people to commit rapes and serious crimes? Can you as a Justice of the
Supreme Court condone such a decision as that?
Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 191. Fortas replied that answering
the question would be improper. Id. at 191-92.
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tees favorably reported bills to curtail the Court's jurisdiction
which received a majority of votes in the House and a substantial
number of votes in the Senate. °s So intense was opposition to the
Court's reapportionment decisions that in 1966 a substantial ma-
jority of senators twice voted for a proposed constitutional amend-
ment to overrule those decisions.20 9 Senators who oppose the
Court's direction are remiss if they do not inform prospective jus-
tices of their views and warn them of possible Senate responses to
unpopular decisions.
The hearings sometimes have provided the nominees with an op-
portunity to defend the Court. During his testimony in 1968, for
example, Fortas attempted to demonstrate that the Court was not
really "soft on crime." He pointed out, for example, that the Court
either affirmed or allowed to stand most of the criminal convictions
presented to it during the 1967-68 term210 and that the Court re-
cently had overruled 211 a 1921 decision 21 2 holding that police who
made an unauthorized search could not seize evidence. 213
Direct exchanges between senators and nominees also serve a
useful purpose when the hearings are not confrontational. Once
again, the O'Connor hearings serve as a model. They provided a
forum for intelligent discourse, concerning a wide range of issues,
in which O'Connor frequently drew upon her experience as a trial
judge. In discussing the balance between the need for a free press
and the need for a fair trial, for example, O'Connor stated that she
never had needed to "close the doors to my courtroom to the me-
dia. 21 4 O'Connor pointed out that "[tlhere are other things that a
court can do to protect a defendant's right in a given situation,
208. E.g., P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-1969, at 332-33 (1972); R.
STEAMER, THE SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS: A HISTORY OF CONFLICT 253-57 (1971); W. SWIN-
DLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968,
at 249-57 (1970).
209. R. CORTNER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 236-40, 243-46 (1970). The proposed
amendment failed to receive the requisite two-thirds majority by only a few votes. Id. at
246. For a full discussion of the apportionment amendment campaign, see R. DIXON, DEMO-
CRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 385-435 (1968).
210. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 171. Fortas, of course, was in
a unique position to defend the Court since he was already a member of it.
211. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
212. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
213. Hearings on Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 115, at 170.
214. Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 143.
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such as sequestering the jury if that is necessary. It is also possible
to change the venue of the trial. 2 15 In discussing the Miranda
rule, O'Connor remarked:
My experience on a trial court is that the application of Mi-
randa has not resulted in an inability of the police to still be
reasonably successful in their efforts to gain information and ob-
tain statements. It has, no doubt, precluded some but on a
broad, general basis I cannot say that I think the police have
been unable to cope with it.2 16
O'Connor expressed some reservations, however, about the exclu-
sionary rule, which she said had affected the outcome of a number
of cases over which she had presided. 17 During other hearings, the
committee similarly has invited nominees to offer their comments
on issues that concerned the nominee. Stevens, for example, advo-
cated increasing judicial salaries and the number of judges. 8 War-
ren Burger, foreshadowing one of the principal interests of his ten-
ure, spoke about the importance of the chief justice's duties as
administrator of the federal court system. 9
VII. THE SENATE AS PUBLIC FORUM
The final function of the Senate in the appointment process is to
provide a forum in which members of the public can express their
views concerning a nominee. Although the Framers did not foresee
this function, the growth of popular participation in the processes
of government and the pervasive impact that the Court's decisions
have on everyday American life make it desirable that private citi-
zens have a voice in the appointment process. Scholars generally
have overlooked this aspect of the Senate's role in the appointment
process; yet input from the public has been an important aspect of
every Judiciary Committee hearing since the nomination of Bran-
215. Id.
216. Id. at 146.
217. Id. at 146-47.
218. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 47.
219. Hearings on Burger, supra note 174, at 5. Burger explained that the chief justice
"has a very large responsibility to try to see that the judicial system functions more effi-
ciently. He should certainly be alert to trying to find these improvements." Id.
1987]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
deis in 1916. The Senate provides a forum for three distinct
groups: the bar, special interest groups, and private citizens.
Representatives of bar associations, law professors, and promi-
nent attorneys customarily testify before the committee or write
letters which are introduced into the record. In 1975, for instance,
the American Bar Association endorsed Stevens on the basis of its
analysis of his 215 opinions on the court of appeals and interviews
with every Seventh Circuit judge, the chief judges of the districts
within the Seventh Circuit, law school deans, more than fifty law-
yers in the Seventh Circuit, and Stevens himself.22 ° Although bar
leaders usually provide ringing endorsements of the nominee,221 se-
vere criticism from prominent members of the legal profession
crippled the nominations of Haynsworth and Carswell.222 Although
presidents sometimes solicit the opinions of the bar prior to mak-
ing a nomination, the Senate's hearings provide a fuller and more
public exposition of the bar's opinions and invite comment from a
wider range of the bar. Members of the House of Representatives
also often testify at Senate Judiciary Committee hearings.223
In recent years, various special interest and lobbying groups
have sent representatives to testify before the committee. The Na-
tional Organization for Women has been prominent at several re-
cent hearings. NOW opposed Stevens and Carswell and Rehnquist
in 1986, but endorsed O'Connor.224 In both 1971 and 1986, the
NAACP opposed Rehnquist.22 5 Labor unions took a leading part in
220. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 18-21. See also Hearings on White, supra
note 171, at 17; Hearings on Minton, supra note 81, at 18.
221. In 1986, for example, the American Bar Association gave their highest recommenda-
tions to Rehnquist and Scalia. See Hearings on Rehnquist, supra note 83; Hearings on
Scalia, supra note 180.
222. Grossman & Washy, supra note 72, at 585.
223. E.g., Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 379-86 (testimony of Rep.
Conyers); Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 314-16 (testimony of Rep. Ryan);
Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 441-42 (testimony of Rep.
McCloskey).
224. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 83; Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, at
88; Hearings on O'Connor, supra note 77, at 398; Hearings on Rehnquist, supra note 83, at
787, 817.
225. Hearings on Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 92, at 289-349 (testimony of Clarence
Mitchell, Director, Washington Bureau, NAACP, and Legislative Chairman, Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights; Accompanied by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Counsel); Hearings on
Rehnquist, supra note 83, at 817-55 (testimony of Althea T.L. Simmons, Director, Washing-
ton Bureau, NAACP).
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the opposition to Haynsworth and Carswell. ss6 The testimony of
special interest groups is vulnerable to criticism because they often
evaluate a nominee on the basis of a single issue. For this reason,
representatives of special interest groups frequently take pains to
emphasize that their endorsement of or opposition to a nominee is
not based solely or even primarily upon the issues of principal con-
cern to their group.227 Even when it concerns a parochial issue,
however, special interest group testimony is appropriate because it
provides the Senate with additional information concerning the
views of the public. The testimony of any one single group should
not itself persuade a senator to vote for or against a nominee, but
the cumulative effect of special interests might properly influence a
senator's vote.
Finally, the Senate provides a forum for the opinions of individ-
ual citizens. A host of obscure persons, including a liberal share of
cranks and oddballs, have passed through the committee's cham-
bers to testify against nominees. On several occasions, in fact, pub-
lic comment has provided the principal focus of the hearing. At the
hearings on Frankfurter in 1939, for example, the committee heard
testimony from a succession of witnesses, including right-wing ac-
tivists, a carpenter, a housewife, and an American Indian represen-
tative, questioning Frankfurter's commitment to the fundamental
ideals of American democracy. Frankfurter's foreign birth, his de-
fense of Sacco and Vanzetti, and his membership on the American
Civil Liberties Union's national committee made him suspect in
the eyes of many witnesses.22 8
Just as testimony by right-wing members of the public domi-
nated the Frankfurter hearings, so liberal and left-wing activists
held center stage at the hearings on Tom Clark in 1949. Various
witnesses denounced Clark for his alleged hostility toward blacks,
226. Hearings on Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 162, 391; Hearings on Carswell, supra
note 70, at 233. Major unions had not opposed a nominee since Parker in 1930. Hearings on
Haynsworth, supra note 91, at 173.
227. At the Haynsworth and Carswell hearings, for example, representatives of labor un-
ions stated that their opposition to the nominee was based more upon the nominee's records
on race than upon their records with regard to organized labor. Hearings on Haynsworth,
supra note 91, at 162-73; Hearings on Carswell, supra note 70, at 212-21, 233-37.
228. Hearings on Frankfurter, supra note 167, at 8, 29, 65, 74-75, 95, 96.
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organized labor, and aliens.229 Witnesses also castigated Clark for
having compiled three blacklists of 150 leftist organizations in his
capacity as attorney general. 30 A member of the board of directors
of a black-listed cooperative bookstore accused Clark of making a
"Roman carnival of the Constitution, '231 and a representative of
the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions pro-
claimed Clark's nomination "tragic. 2 32 Clark was a lightning rod
for criticism because he had served as attorney general, a position
of high public visibility prior to his nomination. Likewise, the offi-
cial acts of Attorney General Robert Jackson and Secretary of La-
bor Arthur Goldberg inspired adverse testimony by private
citizens.2 3
The committee also introduces into its record letters from mem-
bers of the public. The record on Clark's nomination, for example,
contains more than 500 letters opposing Clark's nomination and
approximately 250 letters in support. The committee often accords
importance to letters from the public. During the Stevens hearings,
a number of prisoners who had been tried before Stevens wrote to
the Judiciary Committee in support of his nomination; and Sena-
tor Kennedy concluded that this spoke well of Stevens's fairness.3 4
In addition to receiving testimony and letters from interested
members of the public, the committee members have sometimes
asked nominees questions submitted by the public. During the
hearings on Goldberg, for example, Senator Alexander Wiley asked
Goldberg about certain letters Wiley had received intimating that
Goldberg was a Communist. Wiley later explained that he himself
did not have any question about whether Goldberg was a Commu-
nist, but that he thought that Goldberg should answer the question
because a number of constituents had asked it.23 5 Similarly, one
229. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Tom C.
Clark to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
32, 85, 92, 100, 163 (1949).
230. Id. at 39, 143.
231. Id. at 129.
232. Id. at 100.
233. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Nomination of Robert
Jackson to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 77th Cong., tst
Sess. 1-10 (1941); Hearings on Goldberg, supra note 67, at 83.
234. Hearings on Stevens, supra note 77, at 15.
235. Hearings on Goldberg, supra note 67, at 43.
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senator asked Brennan a question submitted by a right-wing or-
ganization about whether Brennan's Roman Catholicism would in-
terfere with his duty to uphold the Constitution. Several senators
agreed that the committee should not ask Brennan questions about
his religion, but they felt that asking the question was appropriate
because it reflected a matter of concern to some members of the
public.2 6 Although participation by the general public sometimes
may distract the attention of the Judiciary Committee members,
waste time, or raise improper issues, ordinary citizens need to have
a voice in a process that has such a significant impact on their
lives.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Senate's role in the Supreme Court appointment process is
multifaceted, broad, and vital. A vigorous exercise of its duties is
essential to ensure that only capable, healthy, and honest persons
serve on the nation's highest tribunal. Accordingly, no reasonable
aspect of a nominee's record should be beyond the scope of the
Senate's inquiry; and this inquiry is not complete without testi-
mony from interested members of the bar, persons having special
knowledge about the nominee, members of the general public, and
the nominee him or herself. A senator should not hesitate to op-
pose the nomination of any person whose intellectual, professional,
physical, or ethical qualifications are deficient, whose relations
with the president might limit his or her independence, or whose
fundamental judicial or political values significantly differ from
those of the senator. Although the Senate may not substitute its
own nominee for that of the president, no danger exists that an
exacting inquiry by the Senate will lead to such substitution. One
hundred senators could never agree on a single candidate. Initial
deference to the president's choice is therefore a practical necessity
as well as a constitutional command.
Senator Edward Brooke perhaps expressed the Senate's duty
most succinctly and eloquently during the final debate on the
Carswell nomination in 1970. Brooke said:
236. Hearings on Brennan, supra note 169, at 32-34.
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[W]e are not supposed to make a decision based upon whether
one is a liberal or a moderate or a conservative, a Republican or
a Democrat, but based upon our individual responsibility as U.S.
Senators. Each of us, in his own mind and conscience and heart,
must ask[: Is] this a man to sit on the Supreme Court? There is
nothing else.2"7
237. 116 CONG. REC. 10,160 (1970).
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